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ABSTRACT: Using accounting-based (residual income) valuations, this study examines the 
extent to which abnormal returns after insider share trades are explained by private information 
versus mispricing of public information. For a sample of insider trades in the Netherlands (1999-
2008), I find that managers’ share purchase decisions are associated with positive future 
abnormal returns as well as equity undervaluation. Even though undervaluation results in 
predictable price increases, positive abnormal returns following purchases persist after 
controlling for fundamental valuations. Thus, this study provides evidence on the sources of 
managers’ personal trading gains and suggests that positive abnormal returns after insider share 
purchases reflect both private information and managers’ responses to market mispricing of 
public information. 
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Do Managers Trade on Public or Private Information? Evidence  
from Fundamental Valuations 
 
1. Introduction 
 Despite worldwide regulation, empirical evidence suggests that corporate insiders (i.e., 
officers and directors of publicly listed firms) earn abnormal returns when trading their firms’ 
securities (Seyhun 1986; Pope et al. 1990; Betzer and Theissen 2009; Fidrmuc et al. 2011). While 
such abnormal returns are often interpreted as reflecting private information, a potential 
alternative explanation is that insiders have a superior ability in detecting deviations between 
market prices and firm fundamentals. In this study, I examine the extent to which abnormal 
returns following managers’ share trades can be explained by private information versus the 
market mispricing of public information. 
 The study is motivated by evidence in the corporate finance literature, which suggests that 
managers have a superior ability to detect market mispricing. For example, prior research 
suggests that managers repurchase shares (Brav et al. 2005), issue new equity (Graham and 
Harvey 2001), or engage in takeovers (Dong et al. 2006) in response to mispricing. If managers 
also recognize and act on mispricing when trading firm shares on their personal accounts, trading 
in response to mispricing implies that insiders may earn abnormal returns without having access 
to private information. Identifying whether private information or mispricing of public 
information explains the abnormal returns after insider trades has important implications for 
securities regulation focused on deterring profitable trading on private information. 
 Extending managers’ market timing ability to the context of insider trades, I predict that 
insiders’ share purchases are associated with undervaluation and that share sales are associated 
with overvaluation. To assess the extent of over- or undervaluation of a firm’s stock, I rely on a 
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construct specifically designed to detect mispricing. That is, I compute fundamental value-to-
price (V/P) ratios based on the residual income valuation (RIV) model and examine the 
association with managers’ trading decisions. Following prior research (e.g., Frankel and Lee 
1998; Barniv et al. 2010), I posit that firms with relatively high (low) V/P ratios are undervalued 
(overvalued), implying that high (low) V/P predicts positive (negative) future abnormal returns. 
After establishing whether insider trades are associated with mispricing, I analyze whether 
abnormal returns after insider trades are dampened after controlling for fundamental valuations. 
 Using a sample of trades conducted by corporate insiders in the Netherlands during the period 
1999-2008, I first show that purchases of shares are associated with significantly positive future 
abnormal stock returns. Sales of shares are followed by negative, but insignificant, future 
abnormal returns. The positive abnormal returns after insider purchases accentuate for the sub-
sample of smaller firms which potentially have greater information asymmetry and/or mispricing 
(i.e., when firms in the top quintile of firm size are excluded).1 Prior research has generally 
concluded that such abnormal returns reflect managers’ private information advantage. 
 Next, I compute fundamental valuation ratios based on the RIV model for a sample of 9,441 
firm-months. I find these ratios are significantly positively associated with future abnormal 
returns after controlling for a range of control variables (including indirect proxies for mispricing 
used in prior research). Then, if insiders are able to identify and respond to situations of market 
mispricing, I predict they are more likely to purchase (sell) shares in firms with relatively high 
(low) V/P. Consistent with this prediction, V/P is significantly higher in months when insiders 
buy and, to a lesser extent, lower in months when insiders sell their firms’ shares. Hence, 
                                               
1
 Smaller firms are likely associated with greater mispricing of public information due to greater market uncertainty 
about the implications of firm-specific information for future earnings and current value. For example, Zhang (2006) 
shows that smaller firms are associated with greater price drifts after information events, suggesting greater 
underreaction for firms with greater information uncertainty. Similary, evidence in the post-earnings announcement 
drift literature suggests that smaller firms are associated with greater underreaction (e.g., Bernard and Thomas 1989) 
and, hence, more mispricing of public earnings information.  
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insiders’ trading in response to mispricing – which results in predictable price reversals – 
potentially explains an important component of abnormal returns after insider trades. 
 I then examine the association between insider trades and future returns after controlling for 
fundamental valuations and a set of control variables. If abnormal returns after insider trades are 
fully explained by trading on mispricing, the association between trading and future returns 
should disappear after controlling for V/P. On the other hand, if insiders trade on private 
information in addition to trading on mispricing, the association with future returns is expected to 
persist after controlling for V/P. I find that even though insiders purchase when V/P is high and 
V/P is associated with future abnormal returns, abnormal returns after insider purchases persist. 
Comparing results for the full sample of firms versus the sub-sample of smaller firms, I find that 
the incremental abnormal returns after purchases in smaller firms are most likely driven by 
increased private information. Results are robust to estimating firm-specific time series 
regressions in which the firm acts as its own control. 
 Overall, I conclude that insiders’ trading decisions are at least in part motivated by temporary 
deviations between market prices and firm fundamentals. Although such trading contributes to 
the abnormal returns following managers’ trades, managers’ share purchases are associated with 
abnormal returns even after controlling for mispricing. Hence, private information remains an 
important driver of insiders’ purchase decisions. Whether such trading is harmful depends on 
one’s views on the desirability of insider trades. While some argue insider trading is unfair and 
harms investor confidence (e.g., Fishman and Hagerty 1990), others argue that insider purchase 
decisions may provide important private information signals to investors (e.g., Manne 1966).2 My 
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 Jeng et al. (2003) find that, even though U.S. insiders earn significant abnormal returns on their share purchases, 
the expected costs to shareholders of trading against informed insiders are relatively low at 10 cents per $10,000 
transaction. They argue that outside investors (p. 455) “have little to fear from these reported transactions, because 
insider trades make up but a tiny portion of the market.” Hence, the benefits of allowing corporate insiders to trade 
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findings suggest that in addition to signaling private information, disclosures of insiders’ share 
purchases are likely to signal relative undervaluation of a firm’s stock. 
 This study is most closely related to Piotroski and Roulstone (2005). They conclude that 
“insiders capitalize on both outside investors’ valuation errors and their own superior private 
information when making their trading decisions”, but that “trading on the basis of superior 
knowledge is less important than trading on the basis of misvaluation/contrarian beliefs” (p.66). 
My study differs in two major respects. First, their inferences are based on prior returns and 
book-to-market (B/P) ratios as proxies for mispricing and therefore subject to feasible alternative 
explanations (Dong et al. 2006; Ali et al. 2011).3 Instead, I examine the association of managers’ 
trading decisions with a construct specifically designed to detect mispricing. Second, I examine 
the implications of mispricing for the profitability of insiders’ trades. The focus on fundamental 
valuations allows me to better identify the portion of trading gains that is explained by managers’ 
private information and the future returns that are not explained by current mispricing.4 
 This study makes the following contributions. First, while an extensive body of literature 
documents abnormal returns after insider trades for U.S. and international samples, there is 
limited evidence on the sources of such returns. Identification of the sources of insider trading 
gains is constrained by the difficulty of capturing managers’ actual private information. This 
study recognizes that abnormal returns after insider trades not necessarily indicate private 
information. Instead, abnormal returns can reflect i) insiders recognizing mispricing, and ii) the 
                                                                                                                                                        
their firms’ shares, and convey their private information to the market, may outweigh the relatively low costs to 
outside investors. 
3
 See section 3 for further discussion on the alternative interpretations of variation in B/P ratios and prior returns. 
4
 Rozeff and Zaman (1998) and Jenter (2005) also examine the association of insider trades with prior returns and 
B/P ratios. Other studies have examined specific situations in which insider trades are driven by market mispricing. 
For example, Ali et al. (2011) find that U.S. insiders respond to mispricing resulting from price pressure induced by 
mutual funds. Kolasinski and Li (2010) show that U.S. insiders benefit from investor underreaction to earnings 
announcements, while Core et al. (2006) find U.S. insider trading activity to be associated with trading strategies 
based on the accrual anomaly. In contrast to these studies, I focus on the effect of mispricing on insider trading in 
general and further identify the implications of this effect for the abnormal returns after average insider trades. 
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market subsequently reversing the mispricing. Relying on accounting-based (residual income) 
valuation estimates, I isolate managers’ private information by identifying the portion of 
abnormal returns that is not explained by fundamental valuations (i.e., mispricing) and show that 
– on average – abnormal returns are explained by private information as well as mispricing. 
These findings have implications for studies focused on disclosures of insider trades (e.g., 
Brochet 2010), since these disclosures may signal both private and public information. 
 Second, a distinctive feature of this study is that it develops a research design that allows one 
to disentangle private information versus mispricing explanations in settings where market 
trading activities are associated with subsequent abnormal stock returns. While this study 
analyzes insider trades, examples of alternative settings – where managers are directly involved – 
are corporate share repurchases, seasoned equity offerings, stock option grants, or M&A 
activities. In contrast to the insider trading literature that generally interprets abnormal returns as 
reflecting private information, the literature on corporate trading activities generally associates 
corporate trading activity with mispricing (e.g., Grullon and Ikenberry 2000; Baker and Wurgler 
2002; Jenter 2005). Future studies may examine the extent to which managers use their private 
information (versus responding to mispricing) in corporate financing decisions using accounting-
based fundamental valuation ratios.  
 Lastly, the evidence in additional tests of this study adds to a small body of work applying the 
Abnormal Earnings Growth (AEG) model (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 2005) in a fundamental 
valuation context (Penman 2005; Brief 2007). Specifically, while I find the association between 
fundamental valuations and insider trading is not robust to using AEG as alternative valuation 
model, I find this is most likely driven by the inability of AEG to detect mispriced securities. The 
finding that value-to-price ratios based on AEG are not associated with future stock returns adds 
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to recent evidence suggesting that RIV estimations better approximate market prices compared to 
AEG (Jorgensen et al. 2011). 
 This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents background literature, institutional setting, 
and hypothesis development. Section 3 highlights key issues related to the identification of 
mispricing and the choice of an appropriate valuation model. Section 4 presents the research 
design, Section 5 presents the main results, and Section 6 presents additional analyses. Section 7 
concludes the study. 
2. Background and hypotheses 
2.1. Insider trades and future abnormal returns 
 Prior research on insider trading has generally focused on the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, the 
U.K. The consensus of this research is that insiders earn abnormal returns when trading their own 
firms’ securities (Seyhun 1986; Pope et al. 1990; Seyhun 1998; Lakonishok and Lee 2001; 
Friederich et al. 2002) and that disclosures of such transactions trigger strong price reactions 
(Fidrmuc et al. 2006; Brochet 2010; Veenman 2012). These findings appear to be driven by 
insiders’ purchases, given that sales are more likely driven by consumption and diversification 
motives (Ofek and Yermack 2000; Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Jeng et al. 2003). 
 Recent studies extend the literature to the continental European setting. In contrast to the U.S. 
and U.K., many European countries did not have well established rules and enforcement 
regarding corporate insider trading until the mid-1990s (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002). For 
example, Germany only formally prohibited trading on private information in 1994 and did not 
require any public disclosure of transactions until July 2002 (Betzer and Theissen 2009). The 
Market Abuse Directives (MAD), introduced in 2003 and implemented in most countries by the 
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end of 2005, harmonized EU insider trading rules. Christensen et al. (2011) present evidence 
suggesting the implementation of MAD is associated with increased market liquidity. 
 Recent evidence for continental Europe is consistent with that for the U.S. and U.K. Fidrmuc 
et al. (2011) examine insider trades in 15 countries and find that, particularly in better shareholder 
protection countries, insider share purchases are associated with significantly positive future 
abnormal returns. Dardas and Guttler (2011) find significant stock price reactions around 
disclosures of trades in four European countries. Betzer and Theissen (2009) show that German 
insider trades are associated with future abnormal returns. Comparable evidence is found for 
countries such as Switzerland (Zingg et al. 2007) and Sweden (Kallunki et al. 2009). For the 
Netherlands, Degryse et al. (2009) find that insider purchases are associated with significantly 
positive abnormal returns. Cziraki et al. (2011) find that abnormal returns after trades are affected 
by anti-shareholder (corporate governance) mechanisms.  
 Regarding the source of insiders’ information advantage, U.S. based evidence suggests that 
insider trades are associated with future cash flow (earnings) news. Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2005) find an association between net insider trades and future earnings changes. Ke et al. 
(2003) show that insiders sell shares in anticipation of long-term future earnings declines. In 
addition, some insiders contribute to their own private information advantage by managing 
accruals (e.g., Bartov and Mohanram 2004). Hence, knowledge of future earnings performance is 
one potential source of insiders’ abnormal returns. Other studies find that insiders’ asymmetric 
information advantage increases with the firm’s R&D intensity (Aboody and Lev 2000), low 
analyst following (Frankel and Li 2004), low quality financial reporting (Skaife et al. 2011), and 
low corporate governance (Jagolinzer et al. 2011).5  
                                               
5
 The studies in this section focus on general associations between information and insider trades. Other studies have 
focused on specific settings such as earnings announcements (Sivakumar and Waymire 1994), management forecasts 
 8 
2.2. Hypotheses 
 An alternative explanation for predictable returns after insider trades is that managers are able 
to recognize pricing errors that will reverse in the future. For example, Grullon and Ikenberry 
(2000, p.36) argue that, in the context of share repurchases, “with their fundamental 
understanding of the firm and its industry, a firm’s managers are perhaps best positioned to 
recognize when market prices diverge from their true value”. Evidence of predictable returns 
after repurchases and seasoned equity offerings is often interpreted as managers responding to 
perceived market mispricing (e.g., Jenter 2005). Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that firms’ 
current capital structures are determined by past market timing decisions, while Dong et al. 
(2006) show that mispricing affects takeover decisions. Brav et al. (2005, p.514) find that 
“[a]bout one-half of the interviewed CFOs say that their firm tracks repurchase timing and that 
their firm can beat the market, some say by $1 or $2 per share over the course of the year”. 
Survey evidence by Graham and Harvey (2001) further suggests that managers view recent stock 
price appreciation as an important factor in their equity issuance decisions.  
 The above discussion implies that managers recognize and act on temporary deviations 
between stock price and fundamental value. In this study, I predict that managers similarly time 
their personal insider trades in response to market mispricing. This is because trading on (and 
profiting from) mispricing is likely less costly for managers compared to trading on a specific 
private information advantage due to the lower risk of litigation.6 Accordingly, I formulate the 
following “mispricing hypothesis”, stated in alternative form: 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Cheng and Lo 2006), annual/interim report filings (Huddart et al. 2007), restatements (Badertscher et al. 2011), 
bankruptcies (Seyhun and Bradley 1997) or mergers and acquisitions (Seyhun 1990). My study focuses on average 
insider trading behavior. 
6
 This comparison is analogous to comparisons between “active” and “passive” insider trading (e.g., Huddart et al. 
2007). When in possession of private information, passively delaying purchases (sales) after bad (news) events is ex 
ante less costly for a manager compared to actively purchasing (selling) before good news (bad news) events, due to 
the lower risk of litigation. 
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H1:  Insiders are more likely to purchase (sell) shares when their firms’ equity is undervalued 
(overvalued) by the market. 
To the extent that mispricing is corrected at some point in time, deviations between prices and 
fundamentals should predict future abnormal price movements. Specifically, if we defined the 
difference between price (P) and fundamental value (V*) as the degree of overvaluation (positive 
P-V*) or undervaluation (negative P-V*) and such mispricing is reversed within τ units of time, 
the expected return over the period equals: 
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Where RR is the required rate of return (cost of equity capital) adjusted for time period τ. 
Equation (1) implies that relatively high (low) ratios of fundamental value to stock price (V*/P) 
are associated with positive (negative) future abnormal returns when prices correct for 
undervaluation (overvaluation). Hence, if managers respond to mispricing, abnormal returns after 
insider trades are potentially explained the reversal of prior mispricing. This alternative 
explanation allows for abnormal returns in the absence of a private information advantage. To 
test the private information versus mispricing explanations, I formulate the following hypothesis, 
again stated in alternative form: 
H2:  Insider purchases (sales) are associated with positive (negative) future abnormal returns 
after controlling for mispricing. 
If H2 is supported, I conclude that abnormal returns after insider trades are driven by insiders’ 
private information in addition to their potential response to the mispricing of public information.  
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2.3. Insider trading regulation regulation in the Netherlands 
 Although it is beyond the scope of this study to comprehensively analyze institutional and 
legal differences across countries, it is important to highlight the differences and similarities 
between the U.S. and Dutch institutional settings in the context of corporate insider trades. 
Because the vast majority of prior insider trading research has been conducted on U.S. data, this 
comparison helps to better understand how my study fits into the broader literature.7  
 In the U.S., Rule 10b-5 under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
prohibits the trading of the securities of any issuer on the basis of private information. Private 
information is defined as “material nonpublic” information, i.e., information that will move a 
security’s price when made public. While section 10(b) applies to anyone, section 16(a) defines 
corporate insiders more formally as officers, directors, and large shareholders of more than ten 
percent of the equity of a company. These insiders are required to report transactions in the 
issuer’s securities to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) within two business days. 
 Dutch insider trading rules and definitions largely mirror those of the U.S. In the Netherlands, 
the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) conducts the oversight on stock 
market integrity and disclosures of price-sensitive information. As a result of European 
harmonization, the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) was implemented in the Netherlands in 
October 2005. MAD resulted in increased penalties and restrictions on market abuse in order to 
protect market integrity. 
 Similar to the U.S., initially anyone in possession of private information is prohibited from 
trading on this information under the Dutch law. As a result of the introduction of MAD, this rule 
has been replaced for a narrower rule that focuses on primary insiders that have a link with the 
                                               
7
 For a comprehensive comparative legal analysis on insider trading in the U.K., Germany, France, Spain and the 
Netherlands, and the role of European harmonization, see Welch et al. (2005). 
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issuer (Welch et al. 2005). Secondary insiders, however, are still prohibited from knowingly 
trading on private information.8 As in the U.S. definition, private information entails information 
that has not been made public and that could reasonably be expected to have “an effect” on 
security prices when publicized. After the introduction of MAD, the term “a significant effect” 
was introduced, thereby converging to the term “material” used in the U.S.. 
 Before introduction of MAD, rule 46b of the Wet Toezicht Effectenverkeer (Wte) 1995 
required that registered corporate insiders publicly disclose transactions in an issuer’s securities 
before the tenth day of the following month.9 After MAD, Wte rule 46b was replaced by Wte rule 
47a. In January 2007, Wte 1995 was incorporated into the Wet Financieel Toezicht (Wft) 2006 
and public disclosure of insiders’ trades is currently governed in Wft rule 5:60. Corporate 
insiders, required to report their trading activity within five business days, are defined as all 
persons involved in policy making and supervision, other employees with reasonable access to 
price sensitive information, and large “qualified” holders of shares with an ownership of 10% or 
more in the issuing company.10 Hence, the definition of corporate insiders largely mirrors that of 
the U.S. corporate insiders. 
 An important difference between the U.S. and the Netherlands concerns the U.S. “short-
swing” rule under section 16(b) of the Exchange Act. This rule prevents short-term trading 
opportunities to insiders by allowing shareholders to recover profits made by purchasing and 
selling (or selling and purchasing) within a period of six months. Hence, it is not possible for 
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 For primary insiders, who by virtue of their relation with the issuer are privy to private information, the legal 
question of whether these persons knew or should have reasonably known that they possessed private information 
when trading is not relevant (AFM 2010). 
9
 Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the reporting deadline for U.S. insider transactions was also equal 
to the tenth day of the month following the trading. 
10
 Reporting of insider trades is timely in both settings, although transactions are slightly more timely in the U.S. 
(two business days) versus the Netherlands (five business days). An other minor difference is that since 2002, Dutch 
“top executives” are required to report their transactions as soon as possible, “without delay” (Degryse et al. 2009). 
Given the focus of my study on long-run returns after insider trades, this difference in reporting timeliness is unlikely 
to affect the generalizability of my results. 
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insiders to make round-trip trades in periods of six months or less. This rule potentially affects 
the nature of information contained in insiders’ trading decisions in the U.S. versus the 
Netherlands, as no such rule exists in the Dutch setting. Then, if Dutch insiders trade on private 
information and make abnormal returns on their trades, they are more likely to gain from trading 
on private information that materializes within six months compared to U.S. insiders. This has 
potential implications for the horizon over which insiders’ abnormal returns are realized. 
 An other important difference is that, in the Netherlands, trading is prohibited in the two 
months preceding material events, such as the annual earnings announcement, by a Model Code 
introduced in 1987 (see also Kabir and Vermaelen 1996). This is similar to restrictions imposed 
by the LSE Model Code in the U.K. In the U.S., on the other hand, such “blackout periods” are 
not mandated by law. However, this difference in regulation is unlikely to affect empirical studies 
to an important extent, given that many U.S. companies adopt trading bans voluntarily (Bettis et 
al. 2000). 
Overall, I conclude that the institutional setting concerning corporate insider trades in the 
Netherlands is quite similar to that in the U.S.11 The most important difference in rules is the U.S. 
short-swing rule which potentially results in abnormal returns after insider trades that are realized 
over longer horizons compared to the Dutch setting.  
Of course, similar rules do not necessarily imply similar levels of information based trading, 
as enforcement also affects insiders’ expected costs of trading on private information. Although it 
is difficult to compare frequencies of insider trading cases due to differences in scale of the two 
markets, Cziraki et al. (2011) report that the AFM actively monitors insider trading activity. This 
results in several prosecutions and administrative proceedings per year. Further, based on the 
                                               
11
 Degryse et al. (2009, p.11) also posit that “[t]he principles of law concerning insider trading are similar to those 
found in the U.S. or in the U.K.” 
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legal enforcement indices reported by La Porta et al. (1998), one could conclude that enforcement 
in the U.S. and the Netherlands is at the similar, high level. Nevertheless, an extension of this 
study to the U.S. or a cross-country setting would potentially be interesting when specific 
predictions on the costs and benefits of trading on private versus public information can be 
formulated. This is beyond the scope of my study. 
3. Mispricing and fundamental valuation models 
3.1. Fundamental valuations versus prior returns and B/P ratios  
 Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Jenter (2005), and Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) analyze the 
association of insider trades with prior stock returns and B/P ratios as proxies for mispricing. As 
explained below, the book-to-market ratio is a noisy proxy for mispricing leading to feasible 
alternative explanations (see also Ali et al. 2011). Similarly, prior returns do not reflect 
mispricing if price changes simply capture changes in firm and market fundamentals. While 
managers are generally overinvested in their firm’s equity, they are likely to have increased 
incentives to diversify and liquidate their holdings when prices rise (e.g., Ofek and Yermack 
2000). In contrast to managers’ trading in response to mispricing, such trading does not imply 
predictable future price changes. 
 The Residual Income Valuation (RIV) model assists in clarifying the difference between 
fundamental valuations and B/P ratios in a mispricing context. Under the no-arbitrage 
assumption, fundamental value (V*) equals the present value of expected future dividends in the 
Dividend Discount Model (DDM). With the additional assumption of clean surplus accounting, 
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the DDM can be rewritten in terms of accounting numbers with the RIV formula (Edwards and 
Bell 1961; Peasnell; 1982; Ohlson 1995):12 
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where tbv  is the book value of equity per share at time t, re is the cost of equity capital, itx +  is net 
income per share in period t+i, and itri +  is residual income per share in period t+i ( 1−++ − iteit bvrx
). Equation (2) suggests that fundamental value equals the sum of current equity value in the 
balance sheet and the present value of the stream of expected future residual income. 
 Defining “relative valuation” by the ratio of fundamental value to the observed market price 
(V*/P), it can be shown that relative valuation is a combination of the book-to-market (book 
value-to-price) ratio and the price-scaled present value of expected future residual income (pvri). 
 
[ ]
t
i
i
e
iteitt
t
t
t
t
P
r
bvrxE
P
bv
P
V ∑
∞
=
−++
+
−
+=
1
1
* )1(
t
t
t
t
P
pvri
P
bv
+=  (3) 
Equation (3) highlights the important difference between book-to-market ratios and fundamental 
value-to-price ratios. V*/P equals the book-to-market ratio only if a firm earns a return on equity 
equal to its cost of capital, but differs from the book-to-market ratio if it earns positive or 
negative future residual income (pvri). While prior studies testing the mispricing hypothesis for 
insider trades rely on B/P ratios as proxy for mispricing (e.g., Jenter 2005), the literature has 
interpreted B/P ratios in a variety of ways. In addition to proxying for mispricing, B/P ratios have 
been interpreted as proxies for priced risk (Fama and French 1992; Ali et al. 2003), conservative 
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 Clean surplus accounting requires that all changes in shareholders’ equity, apart from transactions with 
shareholders (dividends, share issues, or repurchases) flow through the income statement. Other comprehensive 
income or “dirty surplus” items, which are directly recognized in equity without affecting net income, violate this 
requirement. 
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accounting (Beaver and Ryan 2005; Roychowdhury and Watts 2007), or growth expectations 
(Skinner and Sloan 2002).  
 In contrast, relative valuations (V*/P) based on a fundamental valuation formula, such as 
RIV, conceptually only capture mispricing. To illustrate the difference, a low book-to-market 
ratio may reflect the conservative accounting treatment of research and development outlays for a 
pharmaceutical firm even though the firm can be undervalued by the market (high V*/P). Relative 
valuations based on a fundamental valuation formula such as equation (3) correct for the 
ambiguity in book-to-market ratios as proxy for mispricing. In addition, valuation models such as 
RIV are not sensitive to conservative or aggressive accounting treatments (Palepu et al. 2007) as 
relatively low (high) book values result in relatively high (low) levels of future residual income. 
Similarly, valuation models such as RIV incorporate expected future growth in fundamentals that 
is not reflected in current book values. Thus, while V*/P ratios allow for direct testing of a 
mispricing hypothesis, book-to-market ratios capture mispricing with noise.13 
3.2. Choosing a fundamental valuation model 
 The choice of the valuation model for calculating V/P ratios is a practical issue. Theoretically, 
valuations based on models such as the DDM, RIV, Discounted Cash Flow (DCF), or Abnormal 
Earnings Growth (AEG) model should be similar when forecasts are made over infinite horizons 
(e.g., Lundholm and O’Keefe 2001). In practice, however, valuations vary due to the need for 
forecasts over finite horizons (e.g., Penman 2001). The usefulness of a valuation model in 
practice is determined by the power of its finite horizon implementation.14  
                                               
13
 Frankel and Lee (1998) and Ali et al. (2003) show that V/P ratios based on the RIV model predict future abnormal 
stock returns over and above B/P ratios. Given that B/P ratios are embedded in V/P ratios (Ali et al. 2003), this 
evidence can be interpreted as the superior ability of RIV model based valuations to identify market mispricing. 
14
 In addition, one could argue that the practical power of RIV depends on the validity of the clean surplus 
assumption. However, it is unclear to what extent violations of clean surplus bias valuations in practice. Specifically, 
the randomness and transitory nature of most dirty surplus items (e.g., foreign currency translations) suggests these 
 16
 Finite versions of valuation models are needed because it is not possible to project the 
valuation attribute of a particular model (dividends, earnings, or free cash flows) into infinity. 
The valuation model is split up into a finite forecast horizon and a terminal value component. 
Over the finite forecast horizon, explicit forecasts of the valuation attribute are made for each unit 
of time. Next, simplifying and subjective assumptions are made regarding future growth in the 
valuation attribute beyond the finite forecast horizon. Two important aspects help RIV to become 
a more powerful tool for valuation compared to DDM or the DCF model.  
 First, while DDM and DCF are solely determined by discounted projections of future 
valuation attributes, RIV is “anchored” on the book value of equity. As a result, valuations are 
influenced to a smaller extent by subjective projections and assumptions. In fact, for some firms 
equity book value is already a close approximation of its fundamental value, therefore requiring 
limited additional speculation into the valuation equation (Penman 2005). Second, valuation 
models differ in the extent to which information on valuation attributes is available. In general, 
analysts forecast earnings and these forecasts are widely available. Also, for firms not paying 
dividends, the DDM valuation is solely determined by the terminal value; a discounted target 
price estimate. Hence, the use of book equity as an anchor and the use of earnings as the 
valuation attribute are important benefits that potentially make RIV a more useful valuation tool. 
 Empirical studies confirm the superiority of RIV in approximating fundamental values 
(Penman and Sougiannis 1998; Francis et al. 2000; Jiang and Lee 2005).15 Also, several studies 
                                                                                                                                                        
items should not matter in expectation (Penman 2001). In this regard, Isidro et al. (2006) find only weak empirical 
evidence of an association between dirty surplus items and valuation errors based on RIV for the U.S., while they 
find no association for samples based on France, Germany, or U.K. firms. Hence, even though clean surplus is often 
violated, such violation appears to have limited effects on practical valuations based on RIV. 
15
 Penman and Sougiannis (1998) and Francis et al. (2000) show that practical implementations of RIV outperform 
DCF and DDM valuations. Assuming an efficient market, they find that RIV valuations are associated with lower 
valuation errors and explain more variation in prices than valuations based on the other models. Jiang and Lee (2005) 
test the dynamic stock price implications of RIV versus DDM and find that book values and earnings in RIV contain 
more useful information for equity valuation than dividends in DDM alone. 
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find empirical evidence supporting RIV as a tool for the identification of mispricing (Frankel and 
Lee 1998; Lee et al. 1999; Barniv et al. 2010), thereby making RIV a suitable valuation model for 
the purpose of my study.16 
 Similar to RIV, the AEG valuation model is derived from the DDM:17 
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where agrt is abnormal growth in earnings, defined as the difference between year t cum-
dividend earnings and the expected earnings given earnings in year t-1, i.e., 
11 )1()( −− +−−= tetett epsrdpsrepsagr  (Easton 2004). 
 Compared to RIV, the main advantage of AEG is that it does not rely on the clean surplus 
assumption. Given i) the common violation of clean surplus in practice and ii) because clean 
surplus does not hold on a per-share basis when anticipated transactions with shareholders are 
nonzero (Ohlson 2005), the AEG model has been argued to have important advantages over RIV. 
In addition, analysts forecast earnings, not residual income. AEG therefore provides a more direct 
link between the attribute forecasted by analysts and its use in valuation (Penman 2005). 
 However, it is unclear to what extent these conceptual advantages make AEG a more useful 
valuation model in practice. In contrast to RIV, which relies on equity book value as anchor, 
AEG initializes on a forward-looking and speculative anchor (Penman 2005). Although equity 
book value is a noisy approximation of shareholder value (as discussed in the previous section), it 
                                               
16
 While relaxing the market efficiency assumption, Frankel and Lee (1998) find that V/P ratios based on RIV are 
cross-sectionally associated with future abnormal stock returns. This finding suggests that the relative magnitude of a 
V/P ratio based on RIV is indicatice of the extent to which a firm is under- or overpriced by the market at a specific 
point in time. Barniv et al. (2010) present evidence suggesting RIV can also be used to identify mispriced securities 
in international settings. Lee et al. (1999) show that the time series of aggregate Dow 30 RIV valuations is 
cointegrated with index levels and that value-to-price ratios based on RIV are associated with future market returns. 
Overall, these findings suggest valuations based on RIV can be used to detect instances of mispricing. 
17
 See Easton (2004) for an intuitive derivation of this model. See Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), Ohlson 
(2005), Penman (2005), and Brief (2007) for more theory and discussions on the benefits and drawbacks of the 
model. 
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can be argued to be a more objective starting point than capitalized expected earnings. The 
denominator in the capitalized earnings term further exacerbates this problem. To the extent that 
the discount rate (re) is measured with error, the capitalized earnings term (epst+1/re) can be 
seriously biased.18  
 Evidence on the practical usefulness of AEG versus RIV is limited, but points to RIV as 
producing more accurate approximations of prevailing market prices (Penman 2005; Jorgenson et 
al. 2011).19 Combined with the lack of existing evidence supporting the use of AEG in the 
identification of mispriced securities, I choose to focus on RIV as the main valuation model. In 
section 6.2, however, I return to AEG and test the extent to which it can be used to detect 
mispricing in general and in the specific context of my study. 
4. Research design 
 Motivated by the availability of analyst forecasts of earnings, I use a forecast horizon of three 
years for the finite version of the RIV model as introduced in equation (2). After the forecast 
horizon of three years, residual income is assumed to grow at the average rate of g in perpetuity: 
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For every firm-month with sufficient data, I approximate the per-share value of equity V using 
(5). Following Penman (2005), I set the cost of equity and growth rate parameters equal to 10% 
and 4%, respectively, for all firms. Prior research suggests that alternative (firm-specific) 
parameters have little consequences in settings where one is interested in cross-sectional variation 
                                               
18
 Penman (2005, p.376) argues that “despite decades of endeavor in research in finance, we do not know how to 
estimate the cost of capital that features in both RIV and AEG formulas. To be honest, it is a speculation and 
fundamental analysts warn of building speculation into a valuation. A method that puts less weight on this 
speculative component is to be preferred, all else equal. Of the two, the AEG valuation is more subject to this 
criticism.” 
19
 Penman (2005) presents descriptive evidence suggesting that valuations based on AEG are less accurate and more 
volatile compared to valuations based on RIV. Jorgenson et al. (2011) find similar results while varying assumptions 
and forecast horizons. 
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in relative valuations (e.g., Frankel and Lee 1998; Sougiannis and Yaekura 2001).20 I compute 
fundamental value-to-price (V/P) ratios by scaling the monthly estimate of fundamental value per 
share by the market price P in the same month. When V/P is high relative to other firms in the 
same month, the stock is assumed to be undervalued, while it is assumed to be overvalued for 
relatively low values of V/P (Frankel and Lee 1998; Bradshaw 2004; Barniv et al. 2010). 
 For bv at time 0, I use the book value of equity from the most recent fiscal year for which 
earnings have been announced, scaled by shares outstanding.21 The calculations of expected 
residual income in years 2 and 3 require estimates of book values in years 1 and 2, respectively. 
The clean-surplus relation is applied with an assumption of a constant dividend (d) payout ratio 
to derive expected book values as follows: 
 1101 dxbvbv −+= 10 )1( xkbv −+=     (6) 
In a similar vein, book value in year 2 is derived from expected book value in year 1, expected 
earnings in year 2, and the dividend payout ratio (k). The dividend payout ratio is assumed 
constant over time and is computed from the most recent financial statements. In case of negative 
earnings, the ratio is calculated as ]*06.0/[ 00 assetsd  (Lee et al. 1999). In case 1>k , the 
average payout from the most recent three years is used. Lastly, k is winsorized at 0.5 (Jorgensen 
et al. 2011). 
 
 
                                               
20
 All results presented in this study are qualitatively highly similar when using alternative rates for cost of equity 
and/or growth and using firm-specific discount rates based on CAPM. 
21
 Although book value of equity data may not be available to the market at the time of the earnings announcement, 
results are qualitatively similar when using “synthetic” book values as in Lee and Swaminathan (1999) or when book 
value is assumed to be available to the market four months after fiscal year end. 
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4.2. Data  
 The main tests compare insider trading firm-months to firm-months without insider trades. 
Therefore, I use the largest sample of firm-months available for Dutch listed firms. Table 1 
outlines the sample selection procedure. For the period from April 1999 through December 2008 
(consistent with the insider trading sample described in the next section) I identify 14,397 firm-
months in the intersection of COMPUSTAT Global and I/B/E/S, for 210 distinct firms. Next, I 
drop 218 observations with no one- and two-year ahead median EPS forecast. For the calculation 
of three-year ahead residual income I require either a three-year ahead EPS forecast or a forecast 
of the long-term growth rate in EPS. This results in the deletion of 867 observations.  
- Insert Table 1 about here - 
 The largest drop in observations (2,188) is due to lack of equity book value data on 
COMPUSTAT. Next, 101 observations are eliminated due to negative equity book values 
(Frankel and Lee 1998). I further delete 159 observations with missing stock price on I/B/E/S and 
119 observations with stock price below €1 to preclude extreme ratios due to small denominators. 
Another 772 observations lack data for control variables, while 532 observations lack data to 
compute buy-and-hold returns for the 12-month period starting in the month after measurement 
of V/P. This results in a final sample of 9,441 firm-month observations for 156 firms.  
4.3. Insider trading data 
 Insider transactions are collected from the AFM. Table 2 presents the construction of the 
insider transaction sample. Initially, 18,364 records are identified in the AFM online register for 
the period starting April 1999 and ending December 2008. Many individual trades are reflected in 
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multiple records in the AFM register.22 Hence, the actual number of trades is substantially lower 
than 18,364. I eliminate 583 records for firms not available on COMPUSTAT, 1,733 records of 
firms not listed in Amsterdam, 5,867 records related to corporate financing transactions23, 1,672 
records related to transactions in irregular instruments, and 1,367 records related to option grants 
or other transactions in options. The final sample of 7,142 records reflects 137 distinct firms. 
- Insert Table 2 about here - 
 After careful examination of the data, aggregating multiple trades by firm-day, and requiring 
short-term stock return data around the transaction date, I identify 708 firm-days with purchase 
transactions and 1,477 days with sales transactions. The 1,477 sales firm-days include sales 
resulting from the liquidation of stock options. Following prior research, purchases only include 
open market purchases and do not include purchases through conversions of options (e.g., Cheng 
and Lo 2006; Huddart et al. 2007). The 708 purchase and 1,477 sales firm-days correspond to 
533 purchase and 844 sales firm-months, respectively. After matching these firm-months with the 
sample of firm-months having V/P ratio data, 259 and 560 firm-months remain, respectively. 
4.4. Descriptive evidence on the abnormal returns after insider trades 
 Although concurrent studies have identified the predictive ability of Dutch insiders’ trades 
with respect to future stock returns (Degryse et al. 2009; Cziraki et al. 2011), the sample period 
and data filtering procedure differ in this study. Therefore, to assess the usefulness of the Dutch 
                                               
22
 For example, a manager that exercises one stock option and subsequently sells the acquired share has three records 
on one day in the register reflecting the same disposition trade. First, the manager “sells” an option. Second, the 
manager buys a share at exercise price. Third, the manager sells the share at a price greater than the exercise price. 
This example illustrates the importance of carefully examining the records in the AFM register. A failure to do so 
would result in the purchase of the share at exercise price being treated as purchase, whereas in fact this transaction 
relates to a sale. 
23
 Prior to October 2005, issuing companies were treated as corporate insiders under Wte 46b similar to officers, 
directors, and large shareholders. Hence, the register includes public disclosures of repurchase and share issue 
transactions by firms. Although these transactions are initiated by firms’ management, they are not conducted for 
managers’ personal accounts and hence are eliminated for the purpose of this study. 
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insider trading sample for testing my predictions, I calculate event study abnormal returns around 
insider trading firm-days. Because smaller firms are likely to have greater information asymmetry 
(Lakonishok and Lee 2001), I also separately analyze abnormal returns around trades in 
“smaller” firms, i.e., excluding firms in the highest quintile of firm size (market capitalization).  
- Insert Figure 1 about here - 
 Return patterns are presented in Figure 1 and Panels B and C of Table 2. Consistent with 
managers trading against prior price movements, share sales occur after price increases and 
purchases occur after price declines, on average. These patterns potentially reflect insiders’ 
responses to market overreaction and mispricing (Rozeff and Zaman 1998). Alternatively, these 
patterns reflect changes in fundamentals and managers diversifying their portfolios. After the 
trade, purchases are associated with significantly positive abnormal returns. Share sales are 
associated with negative, but smaller and insignificant, future abnormal returns. This finding is 
consistent with Dutch insiders’ share sales more likely being driven by liquidity and portfolio 
rebalancing needs. Focusing on the “smaller firm” sub-sample, results are similar for share sales, 
while abnormal returns accentuate for purchases. Overall, these return patterns are consistent 
with prior research and suggest the sample is useful for testing my predictions, in particular for 
insider share purchases. Examining purchases for smaller firms potentially increases the power of 
the tests due to the stronger abnormal return patterns. 
4.5. Main models 
 H1 is tested using the following multivariate OLS regression model (firm and time subscripts 
omitted for brevity): 
 
εααα +++++= sTimeDummieControlsSELLBUYVP 210  (7) 
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where VP captures the V/P ratio based on RIV, BUY is an indicator variable set equal to one if 
there is at least one insider purchase in the firm-month, zero otherwise, SELL is an indicator 
variable set equal to one if there is at least one insider sale in the firm-month, zero otherwise. 
Note that given H1, equation (7) is a reverse regression model which allows for an examination 
of the association between V/P ratios and insider purchasing and selling at the same time, while 
controlling for a range of correlated factors. I expect α1 (α2) to be positive (negative). 
 I also test the extent to which insider trading decisions are associated with V/P ratios versus 
other, previously examined, proxies for mispricing. For this purpose, I additionally estimate the 
following logit regression with either the BUY or SELL indicator as the dependent variable: 
 
εββ +++++= sTimeDummieControlsesOtherProxiVPSELLBUY 10/  (8) 
where OtherProxies are the book-to-market ratio and prior returns. Results from this estimation 
allow for a better comparison with prior studies which are mainly focused on the mispricing 
drivers of insider trades (Rozeff and Zaman 1998; Jenter 2005; Piotroski and Roulstone 2005). 
 The following OLS regression model is used to test H2: 
 
εββββ ++++++= sTimeDummieControlsVPSELLBUYBHAR 3210  (9) 
where BHAR is the future abnormal (size-adjusted) buy-and-hold return. Following prior research 
which generally measures the abnormal returns after insider trades over periods of six months 
(e.g., Huddart and Ke 2007) or one year (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone 2005), I create variables 
BHAR6m and BHAR12m that capture the six- and 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns after 
the month of interest, respectively. 
 Due to the panel structure of the data and the autocorrelation in monthly V/P ratios (e.g., Lee 
and Swaminathan 1999) and other control variables, I adjust standard errors in all pooled 
analyses for two-way clustering by firm and month (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). In addition, 
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I control for time effects by including separate indicator variables for years and months. Lastly, 
all continuous variables are winsorized to the 1st and 99th percentiles of their distributions. 
4.6. Control variables 
 Prior research suggests insider trading is more profitable in smaller firms (e.g., Seyhun 1986). 
At the same time, firm size affects stock returns (Fama and French 1992) and investors may have 
more difficulty in assessing the valuation implications of public information for smaller firms 
(e.g., Zhang 2006). Hence, I control for firm size (SIZE) using market capitalization. Because of 
its relation with returns (Fama and French 1992), insider trading (Lakonishok and Lee 2001; 
Piotroski and Roulstone 2005), and mechanical relation with V/P, I also control for book-to-
market (BP).  
 Insiders are more likely to buy shares after price declines and sell after price increases. While 
this is partly captured by the inclusion of BP, I further control for recent price changes by 
including the 12-month buy-and-hold return for the period ending the previous month 
(BHRPRE). While VP captures mispricing, BHRPRE measures recent price changes that may 
reflect changes in firm fundamentals. Following Ali et al. (2003), I further control for leverage 
(LEV), analyst following (NUMEST), analyst forecast dispersion (DISP), market beta (BETA), 
and idiosyncratic return volatility (IDVOL). Controlling for idiosyncratic return volatility is 
potentially important in this setting, as Ben-David and Roulstone (2010) show that the 
profitability of insider trades is positively related to idiosyncratic risk. Following Brochet (2010), 
I further control for loss firms (LOSS) and R&D intensive firms (RND). 
 Lastly, equation (9) includes a variable equal to the inverse of stock price (INVPR) to avoid 
spurious inferences induced by price deflation. Brown and Pfeiffer (2008) argue that the 
empirical regularity of a negative correlation between price levels and future returns may lead to 
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misleading conclusions regarding mispricing of price-deflated variables. They show that 
controlling for this empirical regularity can have important effects on inferences drawn from 
regressions of future abnormal returns on price-deflated variables. Controlling for the deflator is 
important in this study given that i) price levels affect insiders’ trading decisions (Rozeff and 
Zaman 1998; Heath et al. 1999) and ii) price deflation could induce an appearance of mispricing. 
5. Findings 
5.1. Descriptive statistics  
 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics on test and control variables. The average value-to-price 
ratio (VP) is 1.11, suggesting the average firm is slightly undervalued. However, this average 
critically depends on the discount rate and growth rate assumptions and the focus of this study is 
on cross-sectional variation in V/P ratios. Insider trading is relatively infrequent, with 2.7% of 
firm-months having insider purchase activity and 5.9% of firm-months having insider sales. The 
control variables and future return variables show substantial cross-sectional variation. 
- Insert Table 3 about here - 
 Table 4 presents means for all variables for quintile portfolios sorted on V/P. As preliminary 
evidence for H1, insider buying (BUY) is more likely in high V/P firms while selling (SELL) is 
more likely in low V/P firms. The difference between high and low V/P for insider selling, 
however, is not significant. This suggests that, on average, managers trade on mispricing of 
public information only when purchasing shares. These results should be interpreted with care, 
given that most control variables also vary with V/P. For example, there is a large difference in 
firm size (SIZE) between high and low V/P firms. Prior research suggests that insiders are more 
likely to buy (sell) in firms with smaller (greater) market capitalization (e.g., Seyhun 1986).  
- Insert Table 4 about here - 
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 Table 4 reveals no significant association of V/P with B/P between Q1 and Q5, even though 
B/P is a component of V/P (see section 3). This suggests that B/P and V/P likely capture different 
constructs, highlighting the role of incorporating additional (forward-looking) information in 
RIV. Untabulated tests suggest that the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between the two variables 
equals -0.039 (0.147).24 Similarly, the difference in prior returns between Q1 and Q5 is not 
statistically significant, suggesting V/P captures different dimensions than prior returns. 
 The pattern of leverage (LEV) across V/P ratio portfolios further highlights the difference 
between the BP and VP variables. Prior research suggests that high B/P (value) firms are 
financially distressed and have high leverage ratios (e.g., Piotroski 2000). Untabulated tests 
confirm a negative Pearson (Spearman) correlation of -0.088 (-0.143) between B/P and leverage. 
Table 4, however, shows a strong positive association between V/P ratios and leverage, 
consistent with Ali et al. (2003). The descriptives further reveal that V/P is negatively associated 
with analyst following, beta, idiosyncratic return volatility, loss incidence, and R&D activity.  
 The bottom rows of Table 4 present the average future buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the 
V/P portfolios. Recall that low V/P indicates relative overvaluation, while high V/P indicates 
relative undervaluation. Hence, low V/P should be associated with relatively low future returns 
when prices correct for overvaluation, while high V/P should be associated with higher future 
returns when prices correct for undervaluation. Results are consistent with this conjecture. For 
example, twelve-month abnormal buy-and-hold returns are 8.7% higher in high V/P firms 
compared to low V/P firms. These findings are in line with prior empirical evidence on the 
                                               
24
 However, the relation between the two variables is positive when focusing on Q2 through Q5. Untabulated tests 
suggest that the Pearson (Spearman) correlation equals 0.350 (0.353) when observations in Q1 are excluded. 
Nevertheless, these correlations are modest and suggest the two variables capture different underlying constructs. 
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application of RIV in the U.S. (Frankel and Lee 1998; Ali et al. 2003; Bradshaw 2004) or in an 
international context (Barniv et al. 2010).25 
5.2. Tests of the association between insider trading and V/P ratios 
 Table 5 presents results of estimating equations (7) and (8). In these analyses, I use the 
monthly quintile ranks of firm size (SIZEQ) and book-to-market (BPQ), while analyst following 
(NUMEST) and dispersion (DISP) are log-transformed. In estimating (8), I further use the 
monthly quintile rank of V/P (VPQ). Consistent with H1, results of Model 1 suggest that insider 
buying (BUY) is significantly positively associated with V/P. V/P ratios are on average 0.146 
higher in firm-months with insider buying (p-value: 0.004). Results for insider sales are weaker 
with V/P ratios being 0.055 lower in firm-months with insider selling (p-value: 0.086). 
- Insert Table 5 about here - 
 Models 2 and 3 provide similar insights based on the estimation of equation (8). The 
propensity for an insider to buy shares in a given month is significantly greater when a firm is 
undervalued (high V/P). The untabulated marginal effect associated with the coefficient of 0.199 
(p-value: 0.006) equals 0.00524, which suggests that – after controlling for other determinants of 
the propensity to buy – the difference in propensity to buy shares is 2.1 percent higher in months 
with undervaluation compared to months with overvaluation.26 Given the average insider buying 
activity of 2.7 percent for the full sample, this suggests the effect of mispricing on the propensity 
for insiders to buy shares is economically significant. That is, the likelihood of insider buying 
                                               
25
 Although the main interest of this study is in the six and twelve-month holding periods due to the focus on insider 
trades, I also examined the abnormal returns for 18- and 24-month holding periods (not tabulated). For the 18 month 
holding period, the abnormal return differential increases to 14.9%, while it increases to 19.2% for the 24-month 
holding period 
26
 The 2.1% is calculated as follows. The marginal effect of 0.00524 (computed in STATA using the “margins” 
command) indicates the predicted change in BUY when VPQ changes by one unit. Given that VPQ takes on values 
between 1 and 5, the marginal effect of switching from the smallest to the largest group is 4*0.00524=0.02095 
(=2.1%). 
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activity increases by 38.8 percent when a company moves from no mispricing (Q3) to 
undervaluation (Q5), holding all else constant.27 
 Consistent with the weaker result on insider sales in Model 1 and the insignificant abnormal 
returns in Table 2, Model 3 indicates that mispricing does not significantly affect the propensity 
for insiders to sell shares. Comparing the coefficients on VPQ in Models 2 and 3 to the 
coefficients on BPQ and BHRPRE, I find that the propensity to buy is not driven by either book-
to-market or prior returns. On the other hand, the propensity to sell is driven by these factors in 
ways consistent with prior studies. This suggest that the previously documented association 
between insider sales and variables such as book-to-market and prior returns (Rozeff and Zaman 
1998; Jenter 2005; Piotroski and Roulstone 2005) more likely reflects insiders responding to 
price changes that are supported by firm fundamentals rather than driven by mispricing. Insider 
buying, on the other hand, is more likely driven by price changes that signal undervaluation. 
 Models 4 through 6 present the same set of analyses for the sub-sample of smaller firms, 
which excludes observations of firms in the largest monthly size quintile. Results are 
qualitatively similar to the results for the full sample of observations. Specifically, mispricing 
does not appear to differentially affect the propensity to buy or sell shares in smaller firms.  
 Overall, Table 5 provides evidence consistent with H1 suggesting that managers more likely 
buy shares in their firm when it is undervalued. To a much lesser extent, managers sell shares of 
overvalued firms. The asymmetric association with V/P ratios is consistent with the result of 
larger absolute abnormal returns after insider purchases relative to insider sales. Whether the 
abnormal returns after insider trades reflect managers’ private information or their ability to 
detect and trade on market misvaluations is examined in the following section. Results above 
suggest that mispricing is likely to explain at least a portion of these abnormal returns. 
                                               
27
 (2/4*0.02095)/0.027=0.388. 
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5.3. Private information versus public information as explanation for abnormal returns 
 Table 6 presents results of testing H2. In Models 1 and 3, equation (9) is estimated with six 
and twelve month horizon buy-and-hold abnormal returns as the dependent variable, respectively, 
without controlling for mispricing (V/P). Consistent with Figure 1 and Table 2, insider purchases 
(BUY) are associated with significantly positive future abnormal returns. Insider sales (SELL) are 
not significantly associated with future abnormal returns. A comparison of the coefficients on 
BUY in Models 1 and 3 suggests that Dutch insiders realize their abnormal returns mainly in the 
six months after the month of trade. 
- Insert Table 6 about here - 
 Models 2 and 4 control for mispricing by including the quintile rank of the V/P ratio (VPQ). 
H2 predicts insider purchases are associated with positive future abnormal returns after 
controlling for undervaluation. Combined with the evidence on H1 suggesting purchases are 
associated with undervaluation, evidence supporting H2 is consistent with the abnormal returns 
after insider purchases being explained by both public and private information. 
 V/P ratios are significantly positively associated with future abnormal returns. The coefficient 
on VPQ jumps from 0.014 to 0.024 when moving from the six-month to twelve-month horizon. 
This is consistent with RIV based V/P ratios identifying mispricing after controlling for the range 
of other factors included in the regressions (further validating the use of RIV to identify market 
mispricing). Nevertheless, controlling for this mispricing only has small consequences for the 
association between BUY and future abnormal returns. For the six-month (twelve-month) 
horizon, the coefficient on BUY remains significant and only slightly declines from 0.075 (0.071) 
to 0.073 (0.066) when including VPQ.  
- Insert Table 7 about here - 
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 Consistent with Brown and Pfeiffer (2008), INVPRQ loads significantly. This highlights the 
importance of controlling for the effect of price levels on future returns. Table 7 presents results 
for the sub-sample of smaller firms. Results are qualitatively similar, with the exception that the 
coefficients on BUY are larger in all specifications. Interestingly, the coefficients on VPQ in 
Table 7 are approximately equal to those in Table 6 (0.014 versus 0.014 and 0.026 versus 0.024 
for the six- and twelve-month horizons, respectively). Combined with the finding in Table 5 that 
mispricing does not differentially affect the propensity to trade in smaller firms, this suggests that 
the incremental abnormal returns after insider purchases in smaller firms are more likely due to 
managers’ incremental private information rather than more opportunity to act on mispricing. 
 Overall, I conclude that abnormal returns after insider trades reflect both managers’ private 
information as well as their response to mispricing of public information.  
6. Additional analyses 
6.1. Firm-specific time series regressions 
 This section presents an alternative estimation method. Instead of estimating cross-sectional 
regressions on the pooled sample of firm-month observations, I estimate firm-specific OLS 
regressions for the sample of firms that meet two additional criteria: i) there is insider trading 
activity in at least one month, and ii) the firm has at least ten monthly observations of VP. These 
criteria reduce the sample to 7,050 (5,419) firm-month observations for 75 (63) distinct firms 
(smaller firms). This analysis allows a firm to act as its own control and identifies the extent to 
which V/P ratios are different for a firm in months where insiders trade, and the extent to which 
future abnormal returns for a firm are higher in months where insiders trade. 
- Insert Table 8 about here - 
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 Regression summary statistics are presented in Table 8. Results suggest that V/P ratios are 
significantly higher in firm-months with insider purchases. The ratios of positive to negative 
coefficients of 42:21 and 35:16 in Models 1 and 2, respectively, further confirm the economic 
significance of this effect.28 Although negative, the average coefficients on sales are not 
significantly different from zero. Thus, these tests confirm the association between insiders’ 
purchase decisions and undervaluation. 
 Models 3 and 4 re-examine the association between insider trading and future abnormal 
returns while controlling for V/P ratios. For brevity, results are presented for the twelve-month 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR12m) only, while results using the six-month horizon are 
qualitatively similar. Consistent with the findings in Tables 6 and 7, I find a significantly positive 
association between BUY and BHAR. The coefficient is positive in about twice as many times as 
it is negative. In Model 3, the average coefficient on SELL is negative and only marginally 
significant. Combined with the coefficient on SELL in Model 4 and the results in Tables 6 and 7, 
I conclude that insiders gain little from selling shares based on private information or mispricing. 
Results for insider purchases are, however, robust to this alternative method of estimation. 
6.2. AEG valuation  
 To the extent that the empirical implementation of V/P measures mispricing with error, it 
may insufficiently control for insiders trading on public rather private information in the future 
returns regressions. In this section, I evaluate the effect on my main results of using AEG as 
alternative to RIV valuation. 
                                               
28
 Note that in model 1 the estimated coefficient on BUY is zero in 12 cases (=75-42-21). This is because the sample 
is restricted to firms having any buying or selling over the sample period. Restricting the analyses to the 63 firms 
with insider buying or 64 firms with insider selling does not affect the presented results. The same applies to the 
results based on the sample of smaller firms. 
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 Practical implemention of AEG requires a finite forecast horizon. Following prior studies, I 
require forecasts of earnings per share in the next two periods: 
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where ∆agr equals the average expected rate of growth in abnormal earnings growth beyond the 
forecast horizon. Easton (2004) finds that the average market implied rate of growth in abnormal 
earnings growth equals 2.9% for a sample of U.S. listed firms. Penman (2005) applies a perpetual 
growth rate of 4%. Gode and Mohanram (2003) set ∆agr equal to three percent below the ten-
year U.S. treasury bill rate. In this study, I follow Penman (2005) and use a growth rate of four 
percent as in the RIV model.29 Because AEG requires positive EPS forecasts as inputs (Gode and 
Mohanram 2003; Jorgensen et al. 2011), the sample of firm-months is reduced to 8,697 
observations (6,926 observations for smaller firms). 
- Insert Table 9 about here - 
 Table 9 presents results of using VP_AEG, the V/P ratio derived from equation (10). Panel A 
first presents firm characteristics for portfolios formed based on VP_AEG. Consistent with 
Penman (2005), I find that value-to-price ratios based on AEG are substantially higher and more 
volatile than ratios based on RIV. For example, the average value of VP_AEG for the middle 
portfolio Q3 equals 2.070, suggesting extreme undervaluation. Similar to the statistics for the 
RIV based V/P ratios in Table 4, VP_AEG is negatively associated with firm size (SIZE) and 
analyst following (NUMEST). However, the associations with BP, BHRPRE, LEV, DISP, BETA, 
IDVOL, LOSS, and RND are inconsistent with the associations in Table 4. Hence, although I find 
a positive association between VP_AEG and VP, these ratios appear to capture quite distinct 
                                               
29
 Again, as with the RIV implementation, the discount rate is set equal to ten percent for all firms. Results are 
unaffected by changing the constant discount rate and growth rate assumptions, or using firm-specific discount rates 
based on CAPM. 
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elements of firms.30 Univariate results for insider trading are opposite to those based on RIV in 
Table 4. VP_AEG is associated with insider sales rather than purchases. 
 The bottom rows of Table 9, Panel A, suggest that sorts based on AEG do not result in 
predictable differences in future return across V/P portfolios. For example, the twelve month 
return differential between high and low VP_AEG observations is 0.6%, statistically and 
economically insignificant.31 Thus, AEG valuation appears to be of limited practical use for the 
identification of mispricing. This descriptive analysis provides further validation for the use of 
RIV based V/P ratios as the main measure of mispricing. It also adds to Jorgenson et al. (2011) 
who find that RIV is more strongly associated with observed stock prices than AEG.32 Although 
this suggests that RIV is more useful for the detection of mispricing than AEG, I do further test 
the effect of using AEG as alternative valuation model. 
 Panel B of Table 9 presents results of multivariate analyses of the association between insider 
trading and V/P based on the both models. I find no significant association between insider trades 
and VP_AEG, with the exception of a marginally significant coefficient on sales (p-value: 0.089) 
for smaller firms in model 3. Results for valuations based on RIV for the reduced sample of 
VP_AEG observations are, however, consistent with those presented in Table 5. Panel C of Table 
9 presents results of estimating equation (9) with VP_AEGQ. Results suggest VP_AEGQ is not 
significantly associated with future returns. After controlling for VP_AEGQ, I find that BUY and 
RIV based VPQ are still significantly positively associated with future returns.  
                                               
30
 Untabulated analysis reveals that the (Spearman rank) correlation between VP and VP_AEG for the sample of 
8,199 firm-months equals 0.37 (0.31). 
31
 Untabulated tests suggest that increasing the holding period to 18 or 24 months provides similar insights. The 
return differentials (Q5-Q1) equal 1.2% and 0.3% for the 18 and 24 month holding periods, respectively.  
32
 Jorgenson et al. (2011) find that AEG valuations implemented using longer forecast horizons improve the model’s 
ability to explain observed stock prices, but still RIV estimations using similar forecast horizons outperform AEG 
estimations. In untabulated tests, I find that increasing the forecast horizon for AEG to three or five years does not 
improve the model’s ability to detect mispriced securities. 
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7. Summary and conclusions 
 This study examines the association between fundamental valuations and insider share trades 
to provide evidence on the extent to which abnormal returns after insider trades can be explained 
by public versus private information. The study is motivated by evidence in the corporate finance 
literature which suggests managers recognize and act on situations where market prices deviate 
from fundamental values. At the same time, an extensive literature documents that personal share 
trades by managers are associated with future abnormal returns. To the extent that managers also 
respond to mispricing of public information when trading on their personal accounts, abnormal 
returns after insider trades are potentially explained by reversals of prior mispricing. 
 I find that Dutch managers’ share purchase decisions are associated with undervaluation as 
indicated by value-to-price ratios based on the Residual Income Valuation model. While such 
undervaluation results in predictable (positive) price reversals, I further find that positive 
abnormal returns after insider purchases persist after orthogonalizing insider purchases and future 
returns with respect to fundamental valuations. This suggests that the abnormal returns after 
insider purchases reflect private information as well as managers’ responses to the mispricing of 
public information.  
 One important caveat of this study relates to the ability of empirical RIV estimates to identify 
mispricing. To the extent that RIV empirically measures fundamental value with noise, value-to-
price ratios may insufficiently control for the effect of mispricing on future returns. Nevertheless, 
I find robust evidence suggesting that fundamental value-to-price ratios are associated with 
insider purchase decisions as well as future abnormal returns. On a related note, it is impossible 
to fully capture the motivations behind managers’ trading decisions and researchers can only 
approximate these motivations from realized future returns. Instead of attempting to capture 
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private information using noisy proxies for future news, this study takes a different approach and 
identifies the portion of abnormal returns that is not explained by public information. 
 I conclude that managers’ insider trading decisions are at least partly motivated by temporary 
deviations between market prices and fundamentals. Although such trading contributes to the 
abnormal returns following insider trades, managers’ purchases are associated with abnormal 
returns even after controlling for mispricing. This suggests that market participants and future 
research focused on disclosures of insider trades should take into consideration the possibility 
that such disclosures may signal (mispricing of) public information in addition to signaling 
private information about a company’s prospects. Future research could also examine the extent 
to which the precision of financial reporting affects managers’ public versus private information 
advantage. In a cross-country study, one could examine how differences in insider trading rules 
and enforcement affect managers’ trading on public versus private information. Furthermore, 
future studies focused on corporate market transactions (e.g., share repurchases) may benefit 
from using fundamental valuation ratios in a similar fashion to assess the extent to which market 
timing is driven by mispricing versus private information.  
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Figure 1 
Cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) around insider transactions 
 
    Panel A: All firms     Panel B: Smaller firms 
   
The horizontal axis reflects the number of business days relative to an insider trading event (firm-day). The dotted 
(solid) line reflects cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) around insider purchase (sales) events. Panel A 
presents CARs around 708 insider purchase events and 1,477 insider sales events during the period 1999-2008 for 
firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (see Table 2 for sample selection details). Abnormal returns are daily 
size-adjusted returns computed by subtracting the average daily return of similar-sized firms from an individual 
firm’s return. Quintile portfolios are created at the beginning of each calendar month based on total market 
capitalization. Panel B presents CARs around 458 insider purchase events and 938 insider sales events for the sample 
of observations excluding the largest firms (i.e., excluding firms in quintile 5).  
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Table 1 
Sample selection 
    n   Firms 
Months of firms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in the intersection  
    of COMPUSTAT Global and I/B/E/S 14,397   210 
Less:       
  
 - Observations with missing one- or two-year ahead consensus earnings  
    forecast on I/B/E/S -218   0 
  
 - Observations with missing three-year ahead consensus earnings forecast  
    on I/B/E/S and missing long-term growth forecast -867   -1 
  
 - Observations without book value of equity available on COMPUSTAT for  
    the most recent fiscal year -2,188   -38 
   - Observations with negative book value of equity -101   0 
   - Observations with missing price data on I/B/E/S -159   -1 
   - Observations with stock price below €1 -119   0 
   - Observations with missing data on control variables -772   -10 
   - Observations without 12-month future buy-and-hold returns -532   -4 
Final sample of firm-month observations with VP and stock return data 9,441   156 
The initial sample of 14,397 firm-months is obtained by first identifying all firms in COMPUSTAT’s 
“G_SECURITY” dataset on WRDS that have their equity traded on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (EXCHG=104) 
and for which the I/B/E/S ticker is provided (IBTIC). Next, only those firms incorporated in the Netherlands are 
retained (COMPUSTAT’s country incorporation code FIC). For the remaining list of firms, analyst forecast data is 
obtained from the I/B/E/S summary file. This procedure resulted in a sample of 14,397 firm-months for 210 distinct 
firms. Earnings forecasts from I/B/E/S are the monthly median consensus EPS forecast for the forthcoming (FPI=1) 
and subsequent (FPI=2) fiscal year. Monthly I/B/E/S forecasts are matched with COMPUSTAT firm-years based on 
the most recently announced fiscal year in the forecast month (variable FY0EDATS in I/B/E/S is matched with 
variable DATADATE in COMPUSTAT).  
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Table 2 
Insider trading data: Sample selection and abnormal returns 
 
Panel A: Data filtering 
  n Firms 
Initial sample of transaction-records collected from AFM for the period April 1999 
through December 2008 18,364 231 
Less:     
 - Firms not on Compustat Global -583 -42 
 - Foreign firms listed on Amsterdam Stock Exchange -1,733 -25 
 - Repurchases, equity issues, and private transactions -5,867 -15 
 - Transactions in irregular instruments -1,672 -7 
 - Option grants and other transactions in stock options -1,367 -5 
Final sample of transaction-records 7,142 137 
 
Panel B: Abnormal returns around insider trades 
  Purchases (n=708)   Sales (n=1,477) 
  CAR t-stat     CAR t-stat   
[-120,0) -6.01% 2.68 ***   6.01% 4.66 *** 
[-10,0) -1.28% -2.51 **   1.56% 4.82 *** 
[0,0] 0.28% 2.50 **   0.16% 2.01 ** 
[0,10] 0.62% 2.67 ***   -0.11% -0.48   
[0,120] 2.93% 2.06 **   -2.20% -1.48   
 
Panel C: Abnormal returns around insider trades – smaller firms 
  Purchases (n=458)   Sales (n=938) 
  CAR t-stat     CAR t-stat   
[-120,0) -8.68% -2.72 ***   5.50% 3.06 *** 
[-10,0) -1.69% -2.73 ***   1.21% 2.64 *** 
[0,0] 0.31% 2.25 **   0.17% 1.64   
[0,10] 0.60% 2.17 **   -0.26% -0.78   
[0,120] 5.23% 2.76 ***   -2.15% -1.24   
Insider transactions for firms registered in The Netherlands are collected from the public register of the Autoriteit 
Financiële Markten (AFM). Panel A presents the data filtering procedure for transaction records identified in the 
AFM register. One transaction by an insider is often reflected in multiple records. Panel B presents abnormal returns 
for windows around insider trading days. Multiple transactions are aggregated by firm-day and duplicate firm-days 
are eliminated. Abnormal returns are daily size-adjusted returns computed by subtracting the average return of 
similar-sized firms from an individual firm’s return (returns are cum-dividend price relatives computed from 
COMPUSTAT Security Daily data). Quintile portfolios are created at the beginning of each calendar month based on 
market value. Panel C presents results for the sample of observations excluding the largest firms (i.e., excluding 
firms in size quintile 5). In Panels B and C, t-statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted for two-way 
clustering by firm and calendar month (Petersen 2009). ***, **, and ** denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 level respectively. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics on test and control variables 
  n Mean St. dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Mispricing variable 
   VP 9,441 1.110 0.774 0.774 1.056 1.462 
Insider trading variables 
   BUY 9,441 0.027 0.163 0 0 0 
   SELL 9,441 0.059 0.236 0 0 0 
Control variables 
   SIZE 9,441 2,965 7,305 143 458 1,408 
   BP 9,441 0.723 0.728 0.284 0.490 0.857 
   BHRPRE 9,441 0.094 0.476 -0.213 0.043 0.326 
   LEV 9,441 0.606 0.179 0.516 0.637 0.729 
   NUMEST 9,441 11.841 9.287 5 9 16 
   DISP 9,441 0.198 0.297 0.050 0.110 0.210 
   BETA 9,441 1.075 0.656 0.625 0.922 1.379 
   IDVOL 9,441 0.096 0.043 0.068 0.083 0.114 
   LOSS 9,441 0.129 0.336 0 0 0 
   RND 9,441 0.204 0.403 0 0 0 
Future return variables 
   BHAR6m 9,441 0.000 0.242 -0.136 -0.004 0.129 
   BHAR12m 9,441 0.000 0.348 -0.205 -0.009 0.187 
VP is the value-to-price ratio, where value is calculated using the RIV model and price is obtained from I/B/E/S. 
BUY (SELL) is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm-month is identified as having insider purchases (sales), and 
zero otherwise. SIZE equals the market value of equity at the beginning of the month based on I/B/E/S share price 
and number of shares outstanding; BP equals the book-to-market ratio computed as book value per share (Compustat 
data item CEQ divided by number of shares from I/B/E/S) scaled by I/B/E/S share price; BHRPRE is the buy-and-
hold return over the prior 12-month period; LEV is the ratio of total liabilities (LT) to total assets (AT); NUMEST 
equals the number of estimates contributing to the consensus forecast of forthcoming earnings per share from 
I/B/E/S; DISP is the standard deviation of earnings per share estimates from I/B/E/S, set equal to zero if 
NUMEST=1; BETA is the CAPM beta estimated using OLS regressions of monthly stock returns on the equally 
weighted market portfolio for the past 60 months (requiring a minimum of 18 monthly returns); IDVOL is the 
standard deviation of the CAPM regression residuals; LOSS (RND) is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm 
reported a loss (R&D expenditure) in the most recent fiscal year, zero otherwise. BHAR6m (BHAR12m) is the buy-
and-hold size-adjusted return over the six (twelve) month period starting the following month. In multivariate 
analyses, the independent variables SIZE, BP, and VP are transformed to their monthly quintile ranks (SIZEQ, BPQ, 
and VPQ, respectively). 
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Table 4 
Insider activity, firm characteristics, and future returns partitioned by the magnitude of V/P 
 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 t-stat   
VP 0.173 0.864 1.138 1.416 2.001 1.828 17.70 *** 
BUY 0.019 0.024 0.024 0.031 0.040 0.021 2.37 ** 
SELL 0.050 0.085 0.077 0.050 0.035 -0.015 -1.00   
SIZE 5,410 5,419 2,288 1,137 463 -4947.63 -3.25 *** 
BP 0.971 0.559 0.578 0.656 0.856 -0.115 -1.10   
BHRPRE 0.081 0.130 0.103 0.110 0.045 -0.036 -0.79   
LEV 0.517 0.586 0.616 0.639 0.674 0.156 4.87 *** 
NUMEST 13.527 15.568 11.876 9.915 8.163 -5.364 -3.82 *** 
DISP 0.260 0.167 0.145 0.161 0.259 -0.001 -0.02   
BETA 1.292 1.052 1.011 0.977 1.039 -0.253 -2.29 ** 
IDVOL 0.114 0.096 0.091 0.087 0.090 -0.025 -3.42 *** 
LOSS 0.325 0.093 0.060 0.062 0.105 -0.219 -3.83 *** 
RND 0.323 0.245 0.201 0.135 0.112 -0.211 -2.87 *** 
BHAR6m -0.031 -0.012 0.002 0.028 0.013 0.044 2.10 ** 
BHAR12m -0.056 -0.015 -0.003 0.044 0.032 0.087 2.47 ** 
Observations are sorted into quintile portfolios based on the magnitude of VP in every calendar month. All variables 
are defined as in the notes to Table 3. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering 
by firm and calendar month (Petersen 2009). ***, **, and ** denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level 
respectively. 
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Table 5 
Multivariate analysis of the association between V/P ratios and insider trading activity 
  Dependent variable: 
  VP BUY SELL VP BUY SELL 
  Model 1 (OLS) Model 2 (Logit) Model 3 (Logit) 
Model 4 (OLS) 
Smaller firms 
Model 5 (Logit) 
Smaller firms 
Model 6 (Logit) 
Smaller firms 
Test variables 
   BUY 0.146     0.172     
  [2.85]***     [2.95]***     
   SELL -0.055     -0.097     
  [1.72]*     [2.54]**     
   VPQ   0.199 -0.040   0.176 -0.107 
    [2.74]*** [0.47]   [2.15]** [1.28] 
Control variables 
   SIZEQ -0.168 0.055 0.220 -0.121 0.087 0.375 
  [5.94]*** [0.55] [1.88]* [4.22]*** [0.77] [3.36]*** 
   BPQ -0.014 0.035 -0.196 -0.035 -0.004 -0.346 
  [0.59] [0.40] [2.27]** [1.43] [0.04] [3.48]*** 
   BHRPRE -0.103 0.042 0.558 -0.130 -0.007 0.473 
  [2.26]** [0.17] [3.48]*** [2.60]*** [0.03] [2.60]*** 
   LEV 1.318 0.949 -0.089 1.453 1.187 -0.395 
  [7.50]*** [1.64] [0.14] [7.35]*** [1.76]* [0.61] 
   ln(NUMEST) 0.023 0.085 0.043 -0.003 0.011 0.091 
  [0.45] [0.48] [0.21] [0.05] [0.05] [0.42] 
   ln(DISP) 0.139 0.286 0.034 0.200 0.407 0.267 
  [0.73] [0.49] [0.05] [1.03] [0.71] [0.36] 
   BETA 0.012 -0.039 0.321 0.012 -0.103 0.160 
  [0.16] [0.19] [1.16] [0.16] [0.48] [0.56] 
   IDVOL -2.048 1.364 -5.034 -2.022 1.409 -4.364 
  [2.10]** [0.32] [1.17] [1.99]** [0.31] [1.07] 
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Table 5 – cont’d 
 
   LOSS -0.555 -0.521 -0.967 -0.545 -0.587 -0.996 
  [5.03]*** [1.54] [3.68]*** [4.68]*** [1.48] [3.58]*** 
   RND 0.014 0.465 0.082 0.029 0.495 0.059 
  [0.20] [2.29]** [0.30] [0.35] [2.25]** [0.24] 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Month dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
n 9,441 9,441 9,441 7,559 7,559 7,559 
Adjusted R2 0.269     0.263     
Wald χ2   104.27*** 321.24***   92.06*** 273.59*** 
Pseudo R2   0.0506 0.0793   0.0539 0.0987 
Model 1 (4): OLS regressions of value-to-price ratios (VP) on insider trading indicator variables and firm characteristics. Models 2-3 (5-6): Logit regressions of 
insider trading indicator variables on VP, other proxies for mispricing, and firm characteristics. All variables are defined as in the notes to Table 3. t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering by firm and calendar month (Petersen 2009). ***, **, and ** denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 level respectively.  
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Table 6 
Future returns analyses 
  Dependent variable: 
  BHAR6m BHAR6m BHAR12m BHAR12m 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Test variables 
   BUY 0.075 0.071 0.073 0.066 
  [3.13]*** [3.04]*** [2.43]** [2.24]** 
   SELL 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.007 
  [0.48] [0.58] [0.23] [0.34] 
   VPQ   0.014   0.024 
    [3.09]***   [3.06]*** 
Control variables 
   SIZEQ 0.008 0.013 0.006 0.015 
  [1.12] [1.86]* [0.49] [1.13] 
   BPQ 0.014 0.014 0.030 0.030 
  [2.83]*** [2.90]*** [3.72]*** [3.84]*** 
   BHRPRE 0.045 0.045 0.077 0.077 
  [2.64]*** [2.64]*** [2.73]*** [2.73]*** 
   LEV -0.016 -0.053 -0.005 -0.068 
  [0.40] [1.32] [0.06] [0.84] 
   ln(NUMEST) 0.006 0.007 0.038 0.039 
  [0.43] [0.47] [1.46] [1.53] 
   ln(DISP) -0.128 -0.132 -0.194 -0.201 
  [2.62]*** [2.73]*** [2.21]** [2.32]** 
   BETA -0.035 -0.037 -0.056 -0.060 
  [2.09]** [2.25]** [2.07]** [2.24]** 
   IDVOL -0.084 0.003 -0.204 -0.059 
  [0.35] [0.01] [0.47] [0.13] 
   LOSS -0.026 -0.015 -0.051 -0.032 
  [1.25] [0.71] [1.35] [0.88] 
   RND 0.014 0.016 0.004 0.008 
  [0.77] [0.89] [0.14] [0.25] 
   INVPRQ 0.021 0.020 0.040 0.038 
  [4.72]*** [4.60]*** [4.40]*** [4.29]*** 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Month dummies Included Included Included Included 
n 9,441 9,441 9,441 9,441 
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.047 0.063 0.070 
OLS regressions of future buy-and-hold size-adjusted stock returns (BHAR) on insider trading indicator variables, 
firm characteristics, and value-to-price ratios (VP). All variables are defined as in the notes to Table 3, except for 
VPQ which is the quintile rank of VP; SIZEQ which is the quintile rank of SIZE; BPQ which is the quintile rank of 
BP; and INVPRQ which is the quintile rank of the inverse of stock price. t-statistics are based on robust standard 
errors adjusted for two-way clustering by firm and calendar month (Petersen 2009). ***, **, and ** denote 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level respectively. 
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Table 7 
Future returns analyses: Smaller firms 
  Dependent variable: 
  BHAR6m BHAR6m BHAR12m BHAR12m 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Test variables 
   BUY 0.103 0.100 0.094 0.086 
  [3.69]*** [3.63]*** [2.72]*** [2.55]** 
   SELL 0.011 0.013 0.008 0.013 
  [0.78] [0.94] [0.34] [0.56] 
   VPQ   0.014   0.026 
    [2.76]***   [3.03]*** 
Control variables 
   SIZEQ 0.005 0.008 0.000 0.007 
  [0.57] [1.03] [0.01] [0.41] 
   BPQ 0.015 0.016 0.033 0.033 
  [2.64]*** [2.77]*** [3.35]*** [3.54]*** 
   BHRPRE 0.059 0.059 0.106 0.105 
  [3.37]*** [3.38]*** [3.51]*** [3.54]*** 
   LEV -0.001 -0.039 0.008 -0.064 
  [0.01] [0.82] [0.09] [0.65] 
   ln(NUMEST) 0.005 0.005 0.041 0.041 
  [0.30] [0.31] [1.21] [1.23] 
   ln(DISP) -0.119 -0.122 -0.173 -0.179 
  [2.31]** [2.39]** [1.81]* [1.89]* 
   BETA -0.039 -0.041 -0.069 -0.072 
  [2.16]** [2.28]** [2.23]** [2.37]** 
   IDVOL -0.075 0.002 -0.122 0.021 
  [0.31] [0.01] [0.27] [0.05] 
   LOSS -0.020 -0.009 -0.043 -0.023 
  [0.88] [0.40] [1.01] [0.56] 
   RND 0.011 0.012 -0.006 -0.004 
  [0.52] [0.56] [0.14] [0.10] 
   INVPRQ 0.020 0.020 0.040 0.039 
  [3.88]*** [3.93]*** [3.71]*** [3.74]*** 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Month dummies Included Included Included Included 
n 7,559 7,559 7,559 7,559 
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.053 0.069 0.077 
OLS regressions of future buy-and-hold size-adjusted stock returns (BHAR) on insider trading indicator variables, 
firm characteristics, and value-to-price ratios (VP). The largest firms (i.e., firms in size quintile 5) are excluded. All 
variables are defined as in the notes to Table 3, except for VPQ which is the quintile rank of VP; SIZEQ which is the 
quintile rank of SIZE; BPQ which is the quintile rank of BP; and INVPRQ which is the quintile rank of the inverse of 
stock price. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering by firm and calendar 
month (Petersen 2009). ***, **, and ** denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level respectively. 
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Table 8 
Robustness test: Summary statistics on firm-specific time series regressions 
  Dependent variable: 
  VP VP BHAR12m BHAR12m 
  Model 1 
Model 2 
Smaller firms Model 3 
Model 4 
Smaller firms 
BUY 0.191 0.203 0.062 0.076 
  [3.02]*** [2.75]*** [2.60]** [2.82]*** 
  (42:21) (35:16) (41:22) (36:15) 
SELL -0.054 -0.051 -0.037 -0.015 
  [1.42] [1.14] [1.87]* [0.75] 
  (28:36) (25:26) (26:38) (24:27) 
VPQ     0.039 0.038 
      [3.54]*** [2.94]*** 
      (50:23) (43:18) 
n (firm-months) 7,050 5,419 7,050 5,419 
n (firm-regressions) 75 63 75 63 
Adjusted R2 (average) 0.228 0.227 0.081 0.091 
Summary statistics on firm-specific time series OLS regressions of VP on insider trading indicators in models 1 and 
2, and regressions of BHAR12m on insider trading indicators and the quintile rank of VP in models 3 and 4. The 
sample is restricted to firms with at least one active insider trading (buy or sell) month and at least ten monthly VP 
observations. t-statistics are presented in brackets below the average coefficients obtained from n firm-specific 
regressions. (aa:bb) below the t-statistic reflects the distribution of coefficient estimates, where aa indicates the 
number of positive estimates and bb indicates the number of negative estimates. “Smaller firms” are those firms not 
included in the top quintile of firm size (market value) based on monthly sorting. ***, **, and ** denote significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level respectively. 
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Table 9 
Robustness test: Abnormal Earnings Growth valuation 
 
Panel A: Firm characteristics for quintile portfolios based on VP_AEG (n=8,697) 
  Q1  Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5  Q5-Q1 t-stat   
VP_AEG -0.141 1.231 1.934 2.896 6.137 6.279 18.96 *** 
VP 0.976 1.060 1.208 1.319 1.418 0.442 5.69 *** 
BUY 0.028 0.032 0.024 0.023 0.035 0.007 0.80   
SELL 0.063 0.093 0.067 0.053 0.036 -0.027 -2.21 ** 
SIZE 6,501 4,132 2,193 1,353 1,168 -5332.90 -2.79 *** 
BP 0.577 0.492 0.607 0.705 1.048 0.470 4.82 *** 
BHRPRE 0.107 0.132 0.154 0.130 0.026 -0.081 -1.95 * 
LEV 0.588 0.620 0.624 0.617 0.604 0.016 0.56   
NUMEST 15.148 13.912 11.793 10.043 9.483 -5.665 -3.74 *** 
DISP 0.197 0.133 0.145 0.176 0.263 0.066 1.74 * 
BETA 0.901 0.915 0.985 1.065 1.215 0.314 3.46 *** 
IDVOL 0.085 0.083 0.087 0.090 0.106 0.021 3.77 *** 
LOSS 0.040 0.025 0.041 0.068 0.200 0.161 5.25 *** 
RND 0.259 0.214 0.160 0.136 0.180 -0.079 -1.28   
BHAR6m -0.012 0.000 0.010 0.021 -0.009 0.003 0.16   
BHAR12m -0.014 0.005 0.018 0.023 -0.008 0.006 0.21   
 
Panel B: Association between insider trading and mispricing based on VP_AEG versus VP 
  Dependent variable: 
  VP_AEG VP VP_AEG VP 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Smaller firms 
Model 4 
Smaller firms 
BUY 0.192 0.129 0.247 0.143 
  [0.99] [2.60]*** [1.09] [2.38]** 
SELL -0.087 -0.075 -0.215 -0.107 
  [0.82] [2.23]** [1.70]* [2.73]*** 
Control variables Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Month dummies Included Included Included Included 
n 8,697 8,697 6,926 6,926 
Adjusted R2 0.195 0.302 0.170 0.281 
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Panel C: Future abnormal returns tests using VP_AEG as proxy for mispricing 
  Dependent variable: 
  BHAR12m BHAR12m BHAR12m BHAR12m 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Model 3 
Smaller firms 
Model 4 
Smaller firms 
Test variables 
   BUY 0.072 0.067 0.101 0.095 
  [2.39]** [2.25]** [2.86]*** [2.74]*** 
   SELL 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.017 
  [0.44] [0.53] [0.60] [0.76] 
   VP_AEGQ 0.006 0.002 0.002 -0.003 
  [0.92] [0.29] [0.24] [0.48] 
   VPQ   0.020   0.023 
    [2.36]**   [2.53]** 
Control variables Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Month dummies Included Included Included Included 
n 8,697 8,697 6,926 6,926 
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.074 0.084 0.089 
In Panel A, observations are sorted into quintile portfolios based on the magnitude of VP_AEG in every calendar 
month, where VP_AEG is the value-to-price ratio based on the Abnormal Earnings Growth valuation model. Panel B 
presents OLS regressions of value-to-price ratios (VP_AEG or VP) on insider trading indicator variables and firm 
characteristics. “Smaller firms” are those firms not included in the top quintile of firm size (market value) based on 
monthly sorting. Panel C presents OLS regressions of future buy-and-hold size-adjusted stock returns (BHAR12m) 
on insider trading indicator variables, firm characteristics, and the monthly quintile rank of AEG based value-to-price 
ratios (VP_AEGQ). Variables are defined as in the notes to Table 3. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors 
adjusted for two-way clustering by firm and calendar month (Petersen 2009). ***, **, and ** denote significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level respectively. 
 
